on proper names
Posted: Fri Mar 11, 2022 8:31 am
This thread arises out of my impertinent criticism of the proper name ‘Bertrand Russell’ in @Romeran's (old) signature. That felt like breaking a taboo, akin to criticizing someone’s tattoo, so I try to make amends with a thread for Romeran that broaches that most abstruse theme in Tolkien studies, the mystery of names. In this post I sketch three theories of a proper name that have been or may be attributed to Tolkien.
1. An unmeaning mark
2. Disguised meaning
In the early 20th century, Bertrand Russell argued that proper names (as we use them) are really meaningful descriptions in disguise. Here is a passage from his second 1918 lecture on logical atomism:
3. The essence of an individual
This is what I call the Earthsea or LeGuin theory, although its roots are obviously very ancient. The idea is that knowledge of the ‘true name’ captures the essence of the named and gives power over it. This was not a theory of names advanced by 19th and 20th century philosophers and linguists.
In order to appreciate this step, it is helpful to observe how Russell’s theory was developed by the great Danish grammarian Otto Jespersen in his Philosophy of Grammar (1924):
If all this seems overly abstract, consider Bilbo’s riddling of his name with Smaug: in place of the requested name he provides a series of descriptions of himself. Jespersen implies that a complete list of all the descriptions of Bilbo found in The Hobbit would exhaust the meaning of the proper name ‘Bilbo Baggins’ (at least until the sequel appeared).
So far as I can make out, Jespersen’s notion of a proper name is close to that given by Mireth Guilbain in the old plaza thread The Naming of Sauron:
To conclude this TLDR post, I do not agree with this reading of Tom Bombadil. But I do not think that halfir’s mistake is stepping from theory 2 to theory 3. Rather, the mistake is dismissing theory 1, which on the surface appears less exciting than the other two theories of a proper name, but is in reality not only the correct account but also (and perhaps for this reason) far more interesting.
1. An unmeaning mark
So, for example, ‘rose’ as a common name means a kind of flower, but ‘Rose’ as the proper name of someone does not mean anything – it merely serves as an unmeaning mark by which we distinguish this person in thought or conversation.A proper name is but an unmeaning mark which we connect in our minds with the idea of the object, in order that whenever the mark meets our eyes or occurs to our thoughts, we may think of that individual object. (John Stuart Mill, System of Logic, 1843).
2. Disguised meaning
In the early 20th century, Bertrand Russell argued that proper names (as we use them) are really meaningful descriptions in disguise. Here is a passage from his second 1918 lecture on logical atomism:
If you accept the (odd) notion that you cannot name that which you are not acquainted with, then when you use a proper name like ‘Gandalf’ you are really giving a disguised description – that description serving to identify the individual you are referring to.… it does seem a little odd if, having made a dot on the blackboard, I call it ‘John’. You would be surprised, and yet how are you to know otherwise what it is that I am speaking of? … if I wanted to talk about it tomorrow it would be convenient to have christened it and called it ‘John’. There is no other way in which you can mention it. You cannot really mention it itself except by means of a name.
What pass for names in language, like ‘Socrates’, ‘Plato’, and so forth, were originally intended to fulfil this function of standing for particulars, and we do accept in ordinary daily life as particulars all sorts of things that really are not so… A name, in the narrow logical sense of a word whose meaning is a particular, can only be applied to a particular with which the speaker is acquainted, because you cannot name anything you are not acquainted with. You remember, when Adam named the beasts, they came before him one by one, and he became acquainted with them and named them. We are not acquainted with Socrates, and therefore cannot name him. When we use the word ‘Socrates,’ we are really using a description. Our thought may be rendered by some such phrase as, ‘The Master of Plato,’ or ‘The philosopher who drank the hemlock,’ or ‘The person whom logicians assert to be mortal,’ but we certainly do not use the name as a name in the proper sense of the word.
3. The essence of an individual
This is what I call the Earthsea or LeGuin theory, although its roots are obviously very ancient. The idea is that knowledge of the ‘true name’ captures the essence of the named and gives power over it. This was not a theory of names advanced by 19th and 20th century philosophers and linguists.
* * *
After long years of struggle and brain ache I have come to the conclusion that Tolkien held the first theory, that of Mill (though he found Mill’s surrounding explanation preposterous and ‘corrected’ it in The Hobbit). This is to depart from older readings of Tolkien, or at least from the old plaza readings that may be read in that amazing and wonderful thread, Peeling the Onion. On this thread what I find is a curious stepping from theory 2 to theory 3.In order to appreciate this step, it is helpful to observe how Russell’s theory was developed by the great Danish grammarian Otto Jespersen in his Philosophy of Grammar (1924):
Russell argued that a proper name is really a disguised description. But which description? Russell said it did not matter, so long as it established a unique reference (e.g. the hobbit who found the magic ring). Jespersen takes the obvious step of suggesting that a proper name means all the descriptions known to the speaker/hearer.The first time you hear of a person or read his name in a newspaper, he is ‘a mere name’ to you, but the more you hear and see of him the more will the name mean to you. Observe also the way in which your familiarity with a person in a novel grows the farther you read… The meaning or connotation grows along with the growth of your knowledge. (Philosophy of Grammar, 1924, p. 64)
If all this seems overly abstract, consider Bilbo’s riddling of his name with Smaug: in place of the requested name he provides a series of descriptions of himself. Jespersen implies that a complete list of all the descriptions of Bilbo found in The Hobbit would exhaust the meaning of the proper name ‘Bilbo Baggins’ (at least until the sequel appeared).
So far as I can make out, Jespersen’s notion of a proper name is close to that given by Mireth Guilbain in the old plaza thread The Naming of Sauron:
So here we have a Tolkien reading that has its roots in Russell’s account of proper names. But observe the movement from ‘all that is known’ to ‘everything that makes you ‘you’. Here is how one steps from theory 2 to theory 3. ‘Peeling the Onion’ again:Who are you, alone, yourself and nameless? I read this as an affirmation that the name by which an individual is called is reflective and indicative of the individual’s personal nature. That there is no way to answer ‘Who are you?’ with anything other than a name, and therefore the name you supply in response is a summation of everything that makes you ‘you’. (Quoted by halfir in ‘Peeling the Onion’)
The step to theory 3 is taken explicitly by halfir himself, who introduces the term essence and brings up the ‘ancient myth’ that a name captures the essence of a thing. In relation to the hobbits’ lost ponies, who answer to the new names given by Bombadil for the rest of their lives, halfir concludes that Tom Bombadil is a “name-maker”, whose names are in the original language – the “true language” – and hence capture the essence of what is named.In a recent post in Al (What is a symbol?) gerontian wrote: ‘I am not aware of any symbol… which can claim to represent the totality of its subject, except, perhaps, a proper name.
To conclude this TLDR post, I do not agree with this reading of Tom Bombadil. But I do not think that halfir’s mistake is stepping from theory 2 to theory 3. Rather, the mistake is dismissing theory 1, which on the surface appears less exciting than the other two theories of a proper name, but is in reality not only the correct account but also (and perhaps for this reason) far more interesting.